Rice Trade with Cuba: Potential and Constraints

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


Symposium on U.S.-Cuban Agricultural Trade: Reflections, Realities, and Expectations


Overview of presentation

- Cuban Rice Economy
- U.S. Rice Exports
- Trade Potential and Constraints


Rice Consumption in Cuba




Source of total calories consumed in Cuba



Grain Consumption in Cuba: Average calories




Source of Cuba Rice Supply




Cuba Rice Area Harvested




Cuba Rice Yield (milled) Estimates





Sources of Cuban Rice Imports



Characteristics of Cuban Rice Trade

- Import 80% of their rice supply
- Primary suppliers are China, Vietnam and Thailand
- Low quality milled long grain 25% brokens
- G-to-G transactions or deferred payments
- Shipments are bulky 20-30 thousand MT
- Port limitations, warehouse storage

U.S. Rice Exports

- Declining share of use 40%, down from 60%
- Declining share of world trade 11%, down from 20%
- 4th largest exporter 2.6 MMT per year

Structure of U.S. rice trade

- High quality long grain (40%)
 - milled: Saudi Arabia, S. Africa, Haiti
 - brown: EU
- Average quality medium grain (10%)
 - brown: Japan MA
- High quality rough rice (30%)
 - Mexico and Central America
- Low quality long and medium (20%)
 - Government export programs

U.S. Rice Exports

- Competitive position is declining
 - Cost structure is being driven by capitalization of government program benefits - more than offsetting productivity gains
 - 2. Quality of export competitors (Thailand, Vietnam) continues to improve
 - 3. Trade sanctions have resulted in the loss of three major U.S. export markets, equivalent to current total U.S. exports Iran, Iraq and Cuba

- Current policy is inadequate to open markets
 - Trade Sanctions Reform and Export Enhancement Act (TSRA) of 2000
 - Financing
 - Travel
 - Two-way trade

- Proposed legislation in 107th Congress
 - Free Trade with Cuba Act S. 400
 - Cuba Humanitarian Trade Act S. 402/H.R. 798
 - Bridges to the Cuban Peoples Act S. 1017/H.R.
 2138
 - Bipartisan support
 - Over 30 sponsors in the Senate
 - Over 100 sponsors in the House

- Proposed legislation in 107th Congress
 - Eliminates licenses for food, farm machinery and medicines
 - Allows for U.S. financing
 - Eliminates restrictions on travel, remittances and shipping
 - Scholarships for Cuban students to U.S.
 - Extends authority to waive all of Helms-Burton

- Proposed legislation is still probably not enough
- Even if the policy constraints are removed, economic constraints exist

U.S. has higher prices

United StatesLong rough\$150/tonUnited StatesLong milled 25%\$200/tThailandLong milled 25%\$148/tVietnamLong milled 25%\$150/t

But U.S. has better logistics			
	Transport Cost	Transit days	Size tons
U.S.	\$15-20/t	3-5	5-7
Asia	\$30-35/t	40-50	20-25


Can logistical advantages offset price differential?

- U.S. supply eases logistical issues for Cuba
 - port capacity constraints
 - warehouse storage and distribution
- U.S. can sell rough rice
 - May attract Cuba to capture mill value-added
 - Milling infrastructure is badly deteriorated, but
 - Cuba has excess capacity for 200 thousand tons


Competitiveness of U.S. in Central America and the Caribbean region?

- Mechanisms by which the U.S. has enhanced its competitive position
 - government export programs
 - regional trade agreements NAFTA
 - ability to export rough rice

Sources of Carribbean Rice Imports ex Cuba



Source Central American Rice Imports



Conclusions

- U.S. could capture 50% of Cuban market immediately with potential to expand
 - A mix of rough and milled rice
 - Economic impact: \$50-100 million
 - Trade impact: 5-10% increase
 - But export guarantees will be necessary
- Uncertainties
 - Longer-term improvement in Cuba's rice production could limit imports
 - Growth in tourist industry may shift demand for higher quality rice

Conclusions

- U.S. rice industry would be among the first to benefit
- U.S. rice and especially milling industry is in economic distress (50-60% excess capacity)
- Additional trade sanctions reform is necessary to open trade with Cuba
- Trade with the U.S. will not solve many of Cuba's problems and is therefore not compelling from Cuba's perspective